It stands to reason, based on a proof from a mishna, to say that in a case where he acts unwittingly in that he does not know that it is Shabbat, and intentionally in that he knows that the labors he is performing are prohibited on Shabbat, it is obvious to Rabbi Akiva that the intervening days between the Shabbatot are considered awareness of his sin, which would serve to differentiate between one sin and the next. And it is in reference to a case where he acts intentionally with regard to Shabbat and unwittingly with regard to prohibited labors that Rabbi Akiva raises his dilemma, which is about whether the Shabbatot are comparable to separate entities or not.

And Rabbi Eliezer resolved his dilemma for him by stating that in a case where he acts intentionally with regard to Shabbat and unwittingly with regard to prohibited labors, the Shabbatot are comparable to separate entities. But Rabbi Akiva did not accept this resolution from him. And with regard to Rabbi Akiva’s other dilemma, Rabbi Eliezer resolved it for him by stating that subcategories of labors are comparable to primary categories of labor, and one is liable to bring a separate sin offering for each act. But Rabbi Akiva did not accept this resolution from him either.

Rabba said: From where do I say this? As we learned in a mishna (Shabbat 67b): The Sages stated a significant principle with regard to the halakhot of Shabbat: With regard to anyone who forgets the essence of Shabbat, i.e., one who is entirely ignorant that labor is prohibited on Shabbat, and he performed multiple prohibited labors on multiple Shabbatot, he is liable to bring only one sin offering, as there is only a single, comprehensive lapse of awareness.

With regard to one who knows the essence of the prohibition against labor on Shabbat, and he performed multiple prohibited labors on multiple Shabbatot because he was unaware that those days were Shabbat, he is liable to bring a sin offering for each and every Shabbat, as the intervening days are considered awareness which differentiates between the Shabbatot. One who is aware that the day is Shabbat and performed multiple prohibited labors, which he did not know were prohibited, on multiple Shabbatot, is liable to bring a sin offering for each and every primary category of labor that he performed.

Rabba comments: But in the latter case, the mishna does not teach that he is liable to bring a sin offering for each act of a primary category of labor that he performed on each and every Shabbat. He is liable to bring one sin offering for each primary category of labor, despite the fact that he performed the act on multiple Shabbatot. This indicates that the different Shabbatot are not considered separate entities.

Whose opinion is this? If we say it is the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, say the last clause of that mishna: One who performs multiple prohibited labors subsumed, as subcategories, under one primary category of prohibited labor is liable to bring only one sin offering. And if this were the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer it should state: He is liable to bring a separate sin offering for each of the different subcategories of labors as though they were separate primary categories of labor.

Rather, it is obvious that this mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. And you can learn from the mishna that when one acts unwittingly in that he did not know it was Shabbat and he acts intentionally in that he knows that these labors are prohibited on Shabbat, it is obvious to Rabbi Akiva that the intervening days are considered awareness of his sin, which serves to differentiate between the Shabbatot and render the individual liable to bring separate sin offerings for each Shabbat. It is for this reason that the mishna states that if one performs multiple labors on multiple Shabbatot because he was unaware that it was Shabbat, he is liable to bring a sin offering for each Shabbat.

Consequently, it is clear that it is in a case where one acted intentionally in that he knew it was Shabbat and unwittingly in that he did not know that the acts he was performing were prohibited labor, that Rabbi Akiva raises his dilemma, as he is uncertain about whether the Shabbatot are comparable to separate entities. And Rabbi Eliezer resolved the dilemma for him by stating that the different Shabbatot are comparable to separate entities, and different subcategories of labors are comparable to primary categories of labor, and therefore one is liable for each act. And Rabbi Akiva did not accept either of these resolutions from Rabbi Eliezer.

Abaye said to Rabba: You cannot prove your claim from the mishna. Actually, I could say to you that in a case where one acts intentionally in that he knows it is Shabbat and unwittingly in that he does not know that his actions are prohibited labors, it is obvious to Rabbi Akiva that Shabbatot are not comparable to separate entities, as it can be inferred from the latter clause of this mishna that one is not liable to bring a separate sin offering for each primary category of labor performed on each individual Shabbat. And it is in reference to a case where one acted unwittingly in that he did not know it was Shabbat and intentionally in that he knew his actions are prohibited labors, that Rabbi Akiva raises his dilemma to Rabbi Eliezer. The dilemma is whether the intervening days are considered awareness to differentiate between the Shabbatot or not.

And Rabbi Eliezer resolved the dilemma for him by stating that the intervening days are considered awareness to differentiate between the Shabbatot. And Rabbi Akiva accepted this resolution from him, due the ruling of the mishna that one who knows the essence of the prohibition against labor on Shabbat and performs multiple prohibited labors on multiple Shabbatot is liable to bring a sin offering for each and every Shabbat. And Rabbi Eliezer also resolved his other dilemma for him by stating that subcategories of labors are comparable to primary categories of labor and one is liable for each act, but Rabbi Akiva did not accept this resolution from him.

Rav Ḥisda says: In a case where one acts intentionally in that he knows it is Shabbat and unwittingly in that he does not know that his actions are prohibited labors, even Rabbi Akiva holds that the Shabbatot are comparable to separate entities; and when he raises the dilemma to Rabbi Eliezer, it is in reference to a case where one acted unwittingly with regard to Shabbat and intentionally with regard to prohibited labor. And he raises the dilemma in order to clarify whether or not the intervening days are considered awareness to differentiate.

And Rabbi Eliezer resolved the dilemma for him by stating that the intervening days are considered awareness to differentiate the transgressions, and Rabbi Akiva accepted this resolution from him. This is in accordance with the mishna in tractate Shabbat (67b) cited earlier, that one who knows the essence of the prohibition against labor on Shabbat and performed multiple prohibited labors on multiple Shabbatot is liable to bring a sin offering for each and every Shabbat.

And Rabbi Eliezer also resolved Rabbi Akiva’s other dilemma for him by stating that different subcategories of prohibited labors are comparable to primary categories of labor and one is liable for each one separately. But Rabbi Akiva did not accept this resolution from him, due to the final clause of that mishna, which states that one who performs multiple prohibited labors that are subsumed as subcategories under one primary category of prohibited labor is liable to bring only one sin offering.

Rav Ḥisda said: From where do I say that according to Rabbi Akiva each Shabbat is considered a separate entity? This is as it is taught in a baraita: One who writes two letters on Shabbat during one lapse of awareness is liable, as writing two letters renders one liable for performing the prohibited labor of writing. If he does so in two separate lapses of awareness, e.g., he wrote one letter without realizing it was Shabbat, then became aware that it was Shabbat, and then again became unaware it was Shabbat and wrote a second letter, Rabban Gamliel deems him liable to bring a sin offering and the Rabbis deem him exempt. And Rabban Gamliel concedes that if he wrote one letter on this Shabbat and one letter on another Shabbat he is exempt.

And it is taught in a different baraita: In the case of one who writes two letters on two Shabbatot, one on this Shabbat and one on that Shabbat, Rabban Gamliel deems him liable and the Rabbis deem him exempt. Rav Ḥisda explains: It enters your mind that Rabban Gamliel holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva.

Granted, according to my opinion, as I say that in a case where one acts intentionally in that he knows it is Shabbat and unwittingly in that he does not know his actions constitute prohibited labors, even Rabbi Akiva says that the Shabbatot are comparable to separate entities. Consequently, that which is taught in the first baraita, that Rabban Gamliel concedes that if one wrote one letter on Shabbat and another letter the following Shabbat he is exempt, can be interpreted as referring to a case where one acts intentionally in that he knows it is Shabbat but unwittingly in that he does not know his actions constitute prohibited labors. Since separate Shabbatot are comparable to separate entities, the two acts do not combine to form the minimal act of writing that would render one liable to bring a sin offering.